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I.

INTRODUCTION
Each year more than 200,000 children in the United States are abducted by family

members.1 When a child is abducted across international borders, the difficulties are
compounded.2 Since the late 1970s, The Department of State’s Office of Children’s Issues has
been contacted in approximately 16,000 cases involving children who were either abducted from
the United States or prevented from returning to the U.S. by one of their parents.3
At the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1976, twenty three nations
agreed to draft a treaty to deter international child abduction.4 The Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Convention”) was adopted on October 24,
1980 by the Fourteenth Session of The Hague Conference by a unanimous vote of the States
which were present.5 Canada, France, Greece and Switzerland were the first four States to sign
the Convention, immediately following the Conference.6 The Convention was incorporated into
United States law and came into force in the U.S. on July 1, 1988.7

1

See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Committed to Keeping America’s Children Safe (Aug. 6, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/print/20020806.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005)
[hereinafter White House Fact Sheet].

2

See U.S. Dep’t State, International Child Abduction, available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/abduction_580.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
3

See id.

4

See U.S. Dep’t State, Hague Convention Abduction Issues One Possible Solution – The Hague Convention
available at http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_578.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005)
[hereinafter One Possible Solution].
5

See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, ¶ 1 (Apr. 1981),
available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/expl28.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Pérez-Vera]. The states
present and voting for the adoption of the Convention were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
6

See id.

7

See One Possible Solution, supra note 4.
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The Convention reflects a worldwide concern about the harmful effects that parental
kidnapping has on children and a strong desire for an effective deterrent to such conduct.8
Currently, there are seventy-five international states contracting with the Convention.9
This article will discuss the issue of international child abduction, where a petition for
return has been brought under The Hague Convention, and the respondent contends that the
abduction was a result of domestic violence and/or child abuse. First, Part II of the article will
provide extensive background on the provisions of The Hague Convention and relevant United
States laws. Next, Part III will discuss cases where the courts have heard evidence of domestic
violence and/or child abuse and their outcomes. Third, the article will discuss some of the
advantages and challenges of the Convention as it is currently adopted. Finally, some
recommendations for improvement will be made.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
The intent of the Convention is “to protect children internationally from the harmful

effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt

8

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (March 26,
1986).

9

See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Status Table Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (June 2005), available at http://hcch.evision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Convention Status
Table]. The contracting states are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
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return to the State of their habitual residence.”10 Thus, the Convention has two objectives. First,
it seeks to prevent the international removal of children by creating a system of close cooperation
among the judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting States and is not concerned
with the law applicable to the custody of children.11 Second, it has the purpose to secure the
immediate reintegration of the child into his or her habitual environment.12 While each of these
objectives corresponds to a specific idea of what constitutes the best interest of the child,13 this is
not the primary concern of the Convention, which is to secure the prompt return of a child to
their State of habitual residence.
The Convention assumes that questions of custody rights, including consideration of what
is in the best interest of the child, should take place before competent authorities in the State
where the child had their habitual residence prior to removal.14 It may be argued that the
Convention’s object in securing the return of the child ought to be subordinate to a consideration
of the child’s best interests,15 however, “a legal standard for the best interests of the child is at
first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than

10

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, (25 Oct. 1980) available at
http://patriot.net/~crouch/hague.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
11

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 35.

12

See id. at ¶ 25.

13

See id.

14

See id. at ¶ 19.

15

See id. at ¶ 20.
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a concrete juridical standard.”16 This view has been followed by courts in a number of countries,
including the United States.17
The Convention applies only to wrongful removals or retentions between Contracting
States occurring after its entry into force in those States.18 The removal or retention of a child is
considered wrongful where it is in breach of rights of custody, which were actually exercised,
under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately prior to the
removal or retention.19 The Convention provides for four situations where a court in a
Contracting State may at their discretion refuse to order the return of a child:20
1. a period of more than one year has elapsed since the date of the wrongful removal or
retention;21
2. the person claiming that the child was wrongfully removed or retained was not actually
exercising custody rights or has subsequently acquiesced to the child’s removal or
retention;22

16

See id. at ¶ 21 citing Questionnaire and Report on International child abduction by one parent, prepared by Mr.
Adair Dyer, Prel. Doc. No. 1, 22-23 (Aug. 1977).

17

See Thompson v. Thompson, [1994] 119 D.L.R. 4th 253 (Can.) (The Supreme Court of Canada held that “it was
not the function of a Court of the requested state to concern itself with the best interests of the child as the
Convention anticipated that that decision would be made by the home state); see also B v. El-B, [2003] Fam. 299
(U.K.) (The court held that whether it was in the children's best interests to return to Lebanon for their future was to
be decided under the Sharia law); see also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996) citing Hague
International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510 (the exceptions under
the convention were not intended to be used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate, or religitate, the child’s best
interests).
18

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 35.

19

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.

20

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509; see also
Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 113.
21

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 12. This provision was an attempt to acknowledge that, even after a
wrongful removal or retention, a child will at some point become “settled in its new environment.” See Pérez-Vera,
supra note 5, at ¶ 107. Once this has occurred, a return should take place “only after an examination of the merits of
the custody rights exercised over it – something outside of the scope of the Convention.” See id.
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3. there is a grave risk that returning the child would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation;23 or
4. the return of the child would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.24
The burden of proving the necessary facts is imposed on the person who opposes the return of
the child.25 A finding that one or more of the exceptions are applicable does not, however, make
refusal of a return order mandatory.26 The courts retain discretion to order the child returned
even if they consider that one or more of the exceptions apply.27
Following a long-established tradition of the Hague Conference, the Convention avoided
defining many of its terms,28 leaving them to the courts of the Contracting States to interpret.29
This includes terms such as habitual residence, removal, retention, and grave risk of harm. Also
not clearly stated, are the burdens of proof required to find one or more of the exceptions to be
applicable. Not surprisingly, the result is inconsistencies in the application of the Convention

22

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 13(a).

23

See id. at art. 13(b).

24

See id. at art. 20.

25

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 114.

26

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509.

27

See id.

28

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 53 (The only terms defined in the Convention are those in article 5 concerning
custody, where it was absolutely necessary to establish the scope of the Convention’s subject matter).

29

See Nigel Lowe, International Forum on Parental Child Abduction: Hague Convention Action Agenda Held Sept
15-15, 1998 (1999), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC84.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2005) [hereinafter Lowe–Action Agenda].
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both between Contracting States and within courts of Contracting States, such as the United
States.30
There is agreement that the exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly.31 It was generally
believed that the courts in the Contracting States would understand and fulfill this objective and
allow exceptions only in clearly meritorious cases, and only when the person opposing the return
had met the burden of proof.32
The relatively small number of return applications that have been refused on the basis of
Articles 13(b) and 20 appear to confirm this.33 An analysis of the applications made in 1999
under the Convention showed that only eleven percent of the 954 return applications involving
1,394 children resulted in judicial refusal to return the child.34

30

See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), A Family Resource Guide on International
Parental Kidnapping, 50 (2002), available at http://www.ncjrsorg/pdffiles1/ojjdp/190448.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2005) [hereinafter OJJDP Family Resource Guide].
31

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 34 (exceptions are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is
not to become a dead letter); see also Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51
Fed. Reg. at 10,509 (any exception must be drawn narrowly lest their application undermine the express purpose of
the Convention – to effect the prompt return of abducted children).

32

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509.

33

See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fourth Meeting of
the Special Committee to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction (22-28 March 2001) (20 Apr. 2001), available at http://hcch.evision.nl/upload/concl28sc4_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005). Article 13(b) provides that a court in a Contracting
State may, at their discretion, refuse to order the return of a child if there is a grave risk that returning the child
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation;
Article 20 provides for similar discretion where the return of the child would not be permitted by the fundamental
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. See The
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, arts. 13(b), 20 (25 Oct. 1980), available at
http://patriot.net/~crouch/hague.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).

34

See Nigel Lowe et al., A Statistical Analysis of Applications made in 1999 under the Hague Convention of 25
October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 10, 12 (Rev. Mar. 2002), available at
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/abd2001pd3e.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Lowe–Statistical Analysis].
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While Article 13(b) was the reason most often relied upon for refusal to return, only
twenty-one judicial refusals were granted on this basis.35 In order for a person opposing a child’s
return to show that the return would place the child in an “intolerable situation” the person
opposing the return must show that the risk to the child is “grave” and not merely serious.36 It is
interesting to note that while thirty percent of the parents removing a child were male and sixtynine percent female,37 ninety percent of the applications refused on the basis of Article 13(b)
involved female taking persons.38 Since the overwhelming number of victims of domestic
violence are female,39 this may provide one explanation for the high percentage of female taking
persons opposing the return of their child on this basis.
Article 20 was not relied upon in any case studied as a reason for refusing a return
application.40 This may be attributed to the fact that this rule was incorporated into the
Convention as a “public policy clause,”41 which has a difficult burden to meet. The intent of
Article 20 was to include a provision “that could be invoked on the rare occasion that return of a
child would utterly shock the conscience of the court and offend all notions of due process.”42
Whereas the Convention is only enforceable between Contracting States it does not seek
to establish a system for the return of children that is exclusively for the benefit of the
35

See id. at 17.

36

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510.

37

See Lowe-Statistical Analysis, supra note 34, at 8 (numbers do not total 100% due to incomplete data available).

38

See id. at 18.

39

See ABA Comm’n on Domestic Violence, available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2005) (90 - 95% of domestic violence victims are women).

40

Lowe-Statistical Analysis, supra note 34, at 18.

41

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 31.

42

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510.
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Contracting States.43 It is put forward rather as an additional means for helping persons whose
custody or access rights have been breached.44 The Convention has begun to influence some
non-Hague countries where courts now look for guidance to the non-hostile pattern of resolution
employed in Hague cases.45 The Convention’s increasing success is also encouraging more
countries to become party to the convention.46
B.

International Child Abduction Remedies Act
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”)47 was enacted to establish

procedures for the implementation and enforcement of The Hague Convention in the United
States.48 ICARA does not provide any substantive rights; it is merely a procedural mechanism
allowing access to the remedies provided in the Convention in the United States.49 The
provisions of ICARA are in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the Convention.50
Courts must therefore look to the Convention as well as ICARA when determining claims
brought under ICARA.51

43

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 139.

44

See id.

45

See U.S. Dep’t State Bureau of Consular Affairs, International Child Abduction (1995), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/children/9501.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Consular
Affairs].

46

See id.

47

International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-1161 (2005).

48

See id. at § 11601(b)(1).

49

Scott M. Smith, J.D., Annotation, Construction and Application of International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(44 U.S.C. §§ 11601 ET SEQ.), 125 A.L.R. FED 217 (2005) [hereinafter Smith].

50

See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 11601(b)(2).

51

Smith, supra note 49.
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An action brought under the Convention is a civil action brought by the person seeking
the return of a child (petitioner) in any court authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the place
where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.52 ICARA provides that the courts of
the States and the United States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over
actions arising under the Convention.53
A petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a child has been
wrongfully removed or retained, within the meaning of the Convention, to bring an action for the
return of the child under the Convention.54 A respondent who opposes the return of the child has
the burden of establishing:
(A)
(B)

by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set
forth in article 13(b) or 20 of the Convention applies; and
by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception set
forth in article 12 or 13 of the Convention applies.55

Following the example set forth in the Convention, ICARA also does not define what would
constitute a “grave risk of harm” or a “violation of fundamental principles relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the United States for the exceptions
provided for in Articles 13(b) or 20 of the Convention to be applicable. While providing some
additional standards and guidance over that which is provided in the Convention, ICARA
continues to leave significant discretion in the hands of the courts.

52

See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 11603(b).

53

See id. at § 11603(a).

54

See id. at § 11603(e)(1)(A).

55

Id. at § 11603(e)(2).
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C.

International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act
In addition to the civil actions and remedies provided under the Convention, the United

States has enacted the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (“IPKCA”),56 making
international parental kidnapping a federal felony crime.57
IPKCA provides that:
whoever removed a child from the United States, or attempts to do so,
or retains a child (who has been in the United States) outside the
United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental
rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3
years, or both.58
International parental kidnapping is also a crime under state law, although the provisions of state
laws vary.59
IPKCA provides three affirmative defenses. First, the defendant was acting within the
provisions of a valid custody or visitation order;60 second, the defendant was fleeing an incidence
or pattern of domestic violence;61 and third, the defendant failed to return the child because of
circumstances beyond his or her control, notified or made reasonable attempts to notify the other
parent within twenty four hours, and returned the child as soon as possible.62

56

International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (Apr. 30, 2003).

57

See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30, at 73.

58

International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(a).

59

See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30, at 69.

60

See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(c)(1).

61

See id. at § 1204(c)(2).

62

See id. at § 1204(c)(3).
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IPKCA is not intended to detract from The Hague Convention,63 but rather provide an
additional or alternative remedy. The civil and criminal justice systems serve different purposes
with respect to child abduction.64 The former serves to return the child, while the later serves to
punish the abductor.65 Criminal charges are aimed at the wrongdoer and do not address child
recovery.66 Although a child may be located and recovered in the course of a criminal
investigation, a parent cannot rely on the criminal process for a child’s return.67 Ordinarily a
parent must pursue civil means to locate and recover a child at the same time as a prosecutor is
pursuing a criminal investigation.68
IPKCA expresses Congress’ sense that, where applicable, the Convention should be the
option of first choice for a parent who seeks the return of a child who has been removed.69
Where The Hague Convention is not applicable, because the child has been removed to or
retained in a non-Contracting State, a parent may be criminally charged under IPKCA and if the
abductor has fled the country to avoid prosecution extradition may be sought for federal and state
violations.70 Further, criminal prosecution of an individual may be pursued under IPKCA after a
child has been returned pursuant to Hague Convention proceedings.71
63

See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(d).

64

See Patricia N. Hoff, Family Abduction: Prevention and Response, 99 (2002), available at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC75.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Hoff].
65

See id.

66

See id.

67

See id.

68

See id. at 100.

69

See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30, at 74.

70

See Hoff, supra note 64, at 99.

71

See United States v. Ventre, 338 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Ventre v. U.S., 540 U.S. 1085
(2003).
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It is important to note that IPKCA is the only United States statute that makes a specific
reference to domestic violence in connection with international parental abduction.72
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

When is There a Grave Risk of Harm?
Under the Convention, a Court may deny a request to return a child if there is a “grave

risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation.”73 Article 13(b) has been cited as a defense to not
returning a child to their country of habitual residence in forty-nine cases74 of Hague Convention
petitions brought in the United States. The courts have found that the standard required under
Article 13(b) has been met in only ten of these cases.75 In the remaining thirty-nine cases, the
court either ordered the child(ren) returned to the Hague petitioner or dismissed the petition and
refused the return of the child(ren) on other grounds.76

72

See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act § 1204(c)(2).

73

Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 13(b).

74
See Hague Conference on Private International Law: The International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT)
Case Law Search, available at http://212.206.44.26/index.cfm?fuseaction=convtext.showDetail&lng=1 (last visited
Jan. 5, 2006) [hereinafter INCADAT Database].
75

See id. The cases where the courts found that the standard under article 13(b) had been met and refused the return
of the child(ren) are: D'Assignes v. Escalante, No. BD 051876 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991), Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966
F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1997), In re K. v. K., No. C 97-0021 SC (N.D. Cal. 1997), Dietschi v. Dietschi, No. 98-214797-1 KNT (Wash. Super. Ct. 1998), T. v. F., (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998), Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir.
1999), Dimer v. Dimer, No. 99-2-03610-7SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 1999), Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir.
2000), Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001), Danaipour v. McLarey 386 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2004).

76

See id. In most of the cases where the courts refused the return of the child(ren) to the Hague petitioner, the court
found that the Hague petitioner had not demonstrated that the child had been a habitual resident of the state from
which they had been removed and therefore the petitioner could not rely on the remedies of The Hague Convention.
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Friedrich v. Friedrich,77 is viewed as a foundational case in the United States for defining
a “grave risk of harm.” In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated (in dicta) that
they believed
that a grave risk of harm for the purposes of the Convention can exist
in only two situations. First, there is a grave risk of harm when return
of the child puts the child in imminent danger prior to the resolution of
the custody dispute--e.g., returning the child to a zone of war, famine,
or disease. Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious
abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the
court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be
incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection.78
The United States Department of State stated that an “example of an ‘intolerable
situation’ is one in which a custodial parent sexually abuses the child.”79 If a parent removes or
retains the child to “safeguard it against further victimization” the court may deny the petition of
an abusive parent to return the child.80 “Such an action would protect the child from being
returned to an intolerable situation and subjected to a grave risk of psychological harm.”81 Once
again, the discretion left to the courts should be noted. There is no clear requirement that a
petition be denied in the situation where there is evidence of child abuse.
In Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, the plaintiff father (Nunez-Escudero) appealed the
order of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denying his petition, under
The Hague Convention, for the return of his six-month-old son to Mexico after the child’s

77

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).

78

See id. at 1069.

79

See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510.

80

See id.

81

Id.
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mother (Tice-Menley) had brought the child to the United States.82 Tice-Menley provided
affidavits from her parents and a psychologist.83 She alleged that Nunez-Escudero “physically,
sexually and verbally abused her, and that she was ‘treated as a prisoner’ by her husband and
father-in-law.”84 She stated that she had seen her father-in-law hit his youngest son with a
wooden plunger and she feared for her baby’s safety.85 The District Court “determined that there
was a grave risk that the return of the child would expose him to physical and psychological
harm and place him in an intolerable situation.”86 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, while
not stating what evidence would be sufficient, found that the evidence was too general and that
the District Court had improperly considered the impact of separating the baby from his
mother.87 The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions that for Tice-Menley to
prevail, “she must present clear and convincing evidence that the return of the child to Mexico
would subject him to a grave risk of harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.”88
In Ciotola v. Fiocca,89 the plaintiff mother came to the United States from Italy with the
party’s fifteen-month-old daughter.90 Approximately one month later the defendant began to
suspect that the plaintiff might not return to Italy and subsequently filed a petition under the

82

See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995).

83

See id. at 376.

84

Id.

85

See id.

86

Id.

87

See id. at 377.

88

Id. at 378.

89

Ciotola v. Fiocca, 684 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1997).

90

See id. at 766-67.
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Convention for the return of his daughter.91 The plaintiff objected, and alleged, inter alia, that
the defendant had an explosive temper, that she had been a victim of domestic violence during
the marriage, and therefore returning the child to Italy would pose grave psychological harm to
the child.92 The Magistrate hearing the case found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that
returning the child to Italy would expose the child to physical or psychological harm.93 On
appeal, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio found that the facts surrounding the incidents of
alleged abuse during the marriage were seriously contested.94 The plaintiff had neither reported
any situations of abuse to the local authorities nor sought medical attention as a result of
domestic violence.95 A social report was made concerning the defendant and his extended
family in their home town in Italy, however, the report concluded that neither the defendant nor
anyone in his family presented any significant problems that might prove detrimental or harmful
to the normal physical and psychological development of the minor child.96 Based on the record,
the court found that the evidence presented at trial did not establish any serious risk that either
the defendant or any one associated with him would jeopardize the child’s welfare or place her in
grave risk of physical or psychological harm.97 The minor child was ordered to be immediately
returned to her father in Italy pursuant to the Hague Convention.98

91

See id.

92

See id. at 769.

93

See id. at 766.

94

See id. at 769.

95

See id.

96

See id.

97

See id.

98

See id. at 771.
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In the Matter of L.L.,99 the petitioner father, a Dutch citizen, sought the return of his two
children and their half-sister to the Netherlands after they had been removed by the respondent
mother to New York City.100 Although the testimony of the mother and father was “sharply
divergent,” testimonies by a New York City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”)
caseworker, a pediatrician at New York Presbyterian Hospital (“NYPH”), a psychiatrist at
NYPH, and a social worker for the children’s law guardian, regarding their evaluations of the
children, were consistent “that all three children were fearful of their father; that their father
threatened to harm them if they disclosed to their mother that he hit them; that their mother
treated them well; and that they wanted to be cared for by their mother.”101 The psychiatrist
testified that “all three children had post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) . . . the cause of the
PTSD was the excessive corporal punishment and domestic violence and the overall chaotic
discord in the home.”102
The Family Court of New York found that it was highly likely that the father engaged in
a pattern of excessive “corporal punishment” with respect to all the children and domestic
violence towards the mother; however, the court stated that the most important interpretive
principle with regard to the exceptions under the Convention was that they be interpreted
narrowly.103 During the course of the proceedings, the court received a letter from the Dutch
Ministry of Justice which noted that steps would be taken by the Child Protection Board to place

99

In the Matter of L.L. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000), available online at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0273.htm.

100

See id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

See id.
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the children in foster care pending an investigation.104 In light of this the Family Court
concluded that the grave risk exception had not been satisfied.105 The court accepted that
psychological disturbance could result from the children returning, but while it acknowledged
that this risk could be considered serious, it did not warrant being described as grave.106 The
court stated that
the problem with most “post-traumatic stress” claims of psychological
harm in a Convention Article 13(b) context is that the claim is too
broad. Familial domestic violence and excessive corporal punishment
are not infrequent, and are commonly accompanied by associated
psychological disturbances in the affected children. Were all such
claims to be routinely granted Article 13(b) exception status . . .
exception [would] begin to swallow the rule.107
The two younger children were ordered to be returned to the Netherlands subject to the
conditions referred to in the letter from the Dutch Ministry of Justice.108
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California adopted a less
narrow standard in the case of In re K. v. K.109 In this case, the court refused the return of the
child where it found that there was “compelling evidence establishing the potential for serious
psychological harm.”110

104

See id.

105

See id.

106

See id.

107

Id.

108

See id. The court held that the third child (J) had attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate
to take into account her view that she does not want to return to the Netherlands, and to give that view virtually
conclusive weight. See id. Accordingly the Court did not order her return to the Netherlands, although explicitly
stating that it nonetheless had the discretion to do so. See id.
109

In re K. v. K., No. C 97-0021 SC (N.D. Cal. 1997) available online at
http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0127.htm.
110

Id.
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Mr. K. and Ms. K. resided in Australia with their thirty-two-month-old child.111
According to the report of the Australian police, Mr. K. slapped Ms. K. across the face and
threatened her with a knife and belt.112 Mr. K. was taken into custody, and when he returned
home the next day, he discovered that Ms. K. had left with their child.113 Ms. K. departed from
Australia, with the child, to California.114
The evidence of Mr. K.’s abuse of Ms. K. was relatively limited and there was only one
statement by Ms. K. alleging any direct threat to the child.115 Nevertheless, the court held that
“in light of the prior history of alleged abuse and discord that has existed between the parties, . . .
the return of the child to Australia would pose a grave risk to the child’s well being,”116 and
denied Mr. K.’s request for the return of the child.
Steffen F. and Severina P. were married and living in Germany, with their two children Jaime F. and Tricia P.117 Approximately two years later, Severina left Germany with the two
children for the United States.118 Steffen filed a petition for the return for the children pursuant
to The Hague Convention.119

111

See id.

112

See id.

113

See id.

114

See id.

115

See id.

116

Id.

117

See Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp. 922, 923 (D. Ariz. 1997) (Jaime was the child of both Severina and
Steffen, however, Tricia was not Steffen’s natural child).
118

See id.

119

See id. at 925.

37629-text.native.1142898110 - 3/23/2006

Page 19 of 35

Evidence was presented at trial indicating that Tricia had been sexually abused, including
testimony that she had engaged in “inappropriately sexualized conduct” and testimony of a
clinical psychologist that she had been sexually molested.120 Steffen denied that he had abused
Tricia and testified that Severina had threatened him with sexual abuse allegations if he contested
Jaime’s custody.121
Further testimony was presented as to the psychological status of both children.122 The
clinical psychologist testified that both children were attached and bonded to their mother.123
The doctor testified that removal of Jaime from his mother for any period of time longer than a
few weeks would likely result in un-bonding and un-attachment, constituting a grave risk of
psychological harm.124
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that Severina had failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Steffen sexually abused Tricia.125 However,
citing Rydder v. Rydder126 the court stated that “‘specific evidence of potential harm’ to a child
may constitute grave risk of harm under The Hague Convention.”127 The court held that
Severina had “established by clear and convincing evidence that Jaime’s return would expose

120

See id. at 924.

121

See id.

122

See id.

123

See id.

124

See id. at 927.

125

See id. at 930.

126

Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995).

127

Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp at 927; see also B. v. B., Family Court of Westerberg (1992) (A German
court found that a grave risk of harm existed should a German child abducted from Texas and taken to Germany be
returned to Texas, because of the “intensive bond between [German] mother and child”).
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him to grave risk of psychological harm . . . because Jaime ha[d] bonded and attached to his
mother”128 and refused the return of the children to Germany.
In the case of T. v. F., the mother filed an action in the Dutch courts seeking the
dissolution of her marriage to the father, and seeking temporary custody of their child.129 Prior
to this time, the mother had made claims and allegations to the Dutch police that the father had
sexually abused the child.130 The allegations were based on statements made to her by the child
that his father “hurt him” and her discovery of the child in the father’s bed with his pajama
bottoms removed and buried in the sheets.131 The Dutch court awarded temporary custody to the
father, and declined to investigate and/or make any findings in connection with the mother’s
allegations.132 Shortly thereafter the mother left Holland, with the child, for the United States.133
The father filed a petition for the return of the child under The Hague Convention.134 The
mother asserted that “the return of the child to the Netherlands would present a grave risk to the
child and would expose the child to physical and psychological harm, and place him in an
intolerable situation.”135

128

See id. at 930.

129

See T. v. F., (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) available online at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0307.htm.

130

See id.

131

See id.

132

See id.

133

See id.

134

See id.

135

Id.
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The child was interviewed by a psychiatric social worker and examined by a pediatrician
at Yale University Medical School.136 The doctor testified that, although he could not say with
medical certainty that the child had been sexually abused, based on reasonable medical
probability, the child had been subjected to anal sexual abuse.137
The Superior Court of Connecticut held that, based upon all the evidence presented, it
had been established “in total, by clear and convincing evidence” that the father had sexually
abused the child.138 The court, therefore, concluded that a return of the minor child to Holland
would cause “grave risk of physical and psychological harm” to him and refused to return the
child.139
In Walsh v. Walsh,140 the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,141 holding that the return of the
children (M.W. and E.W.) to Ireland would expose them to a grave risk of physical or
psychological harm, barring their return under The Hague Convention.142
For five years, John Walsh beat his wife Jacqueline.143 Jacqueline was advised by her
doctor to seek protection and to get a barring order from a court.144 After one beating, Jacqueline

136

See id.

137

See id.

138

See id.

139

See id.

140

Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Walsh v. Walsh, 531 U.S. 1159 (2001).

141

In re Walsh, 31 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Mass. 1999) (Walsh I).

142

See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 204.

143

See id. at 209.

144

See id. at 209-10.
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reported John to the local police who told her that domestic abuse was not uncommon in their
town.145 Despite a protection order and agreement that John would vacate their house and let
Jacqueline and the children stay there, John continued to threaten harm.146 Afraid for the safety
of her children and herself, Jacqueline left Ireland with the children and flew to the United
States.147
John filed a petition in the United States District Court of Massachusetts for the return of
M.W. and E.W. to Ireland pursuant to The Hague Convention.148 Jacqueline’s defense was that
returning the children would pose a grave risk of physical or psychological harm.149 At trial,
Jacqueline offered testimony of three witnesses testifying, inter alia, that “John slapped, hit,
berated, and spit at M.W. . . . he would lock the children in their rooms, . . . and M.W. was often
present when he abused”150 Jacqueline. Medical testimony was also offered that M.W. was
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and although she had gone into remission since
being brought to the United States, she would likely suffer a relapse if she were returned to
Ireland.151 Although John presented no witnesses at trial, and simply denied that he was abusive
in papers filed with the court, the district court entered an order in John’s favor and ordered the
children to be returned to Ireland.152 The court concluded that “the evidence does not reveal an

145

See id. at 210.

146

See id.

147

See id. at 211.

148

See id. at 212.

149

See id.

150

Id.

151

See id. at 211.

152

See id. at 212, citing Walsh I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
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immediate, serious threat to the children’s physical safety that cannot be dealt with by the proper
Irish authorities.”153
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the district court “raised the
Article 13(b) bar higher than the Convention requires. . . . The Convention does not require that
the risk be ‘immediate;’ only that it be grave.”154 The court found that given John’s clear and
long history of spousal abuse, violence directed at his own children, and chronic disobedience of
court orders, the risk of both physical and psychological harm was high.155
In Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos,156 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington found that although the petitioner had not met the requirement for a
Hague petition, (there was no habitual residence in Greece when the mother removed the
children to the United States), assuming Greece was the children’s habitual residence, their
return to Greece “would pose a grave risk of physical and psychological harm or would be an
intolerable situation.”157
In January 2000, Kristi Tsarbopoulos (“Ms. T.”) removed her three children from
Greece.158 Anthony Tsarbopoulos (“Mr. T.”) commenced an action for the return of the children
under The Hague Convention.159 Mt. T. had been physically abusive towards his wife while they

153

See id. at 217, citing Walsh I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 206.

154

Id. at 218.

155

See id. at 220-21.

156

Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001).

157

Id. at 1047.

158

See id. at 1049.

159

See id. at 1046.
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were dating and after they married.160 At trial, undisputed testimony was presented that the
youngest child had suffered night tremors since birth, and seldom, if ever slept through the
night.161 The court found testimony offered by a child therapist that the middle child had been
physically and sexually abused and associated this abuse with her father to be credible and
reliable.162 A licensed child mental health therapist concluded that the oldest child had also been
subjected to significant physical and emotional abuse which he associated with his father.163
Additionally, all three children were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.164
Although denied by Mr. T., the Court found the evidence of physical and emotional
abuse of the children to be persuasive, and that the children would face a grave risk of physical
and psychological harm if they were returned to Greece.165 The Court found that although Ms.
T.’s return to the United States was not actionable under the Hague Convention, in the
alternative, the court concluded that as a matter of law, the exception under Article 13(b) of The
Hague Convention applied.166 The petition for the return of the children was denied.167
These cases exemplify the inconsistencies in the courts application of the “grave risk”
standard. This is due to the lack of clear definition of what constitutes a “grave risk of harm,”

160

See id. at 1050.

161

See id. at 1059.

162

See id.
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See id. at 1060.

164

See id.
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See id. at 1060-61.
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See id. at 1062.
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See id.
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and the fact that even where the court does find that the standard has been met, the court
maintains discretion to return the child.
B.

What Constitutes a Violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms?
Article 20 of The Hague Convention provides that a Contracting State may refuse to

order the return of a child if the return of the child would not be permitted by the fundamental
principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.168 Article 20 has been cited as a defense to not returning a child to their country of
habitual residence in nine cases of Hague Convention petitions brought in the United States.169
The courts have found that the standard required under Article 20 has not been met in any of
these cases.170 It should be noted, however, that in two of these cases171 the return of the
child(ren) was refused on other grounds. Most of the arguments made with regard to Article 20
defenses relate to the rights of the parent challenging the request for the return of the child be
denied, not the rights of the child.
In Ciotola v. Fiocca, the rights of the child were the basis for the Article 20 claim.172 The
Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, however, rejected the mother's arguments that the court's
failure to apply a “best interest” test in determining whether the child should be returned violated
the child's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.173 In Freier v. Freier,174 the
168

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 20.

169

See INCADAT Database, supra note 74.

170

See id.

171

See id. The two cases where the return of the child was refused on other grounds were Steffen F. v. Severina P.,
966 F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1997), where the court refused the return of the child based on article 13(b) and Journe v.
Journe, 911 F. Supp. 43 (D.P.R. 1995), where the court refused the return of the children based on article 13(a).

172

Ciotola v. Fiocca, 684 N.E.2d 763.

173

See id. at 35.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the mother’s argument
that a temporary injunction prohibiting her from leaving Israel, until the divorce and custody
proceedings were settled, violated her human rights and fundamental freedoms.175 The Court
specifically noted that the argument focused primarily on the mother’s rights even though it is
not clear that The Hague Convention's focus under Article 20 is on the parents' rights as opposed
to the child's rights.176 Similarly, in Fabri v. Pritikin-Fabri,177 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois rejected the mother’s argument that a return order would
violate her right to travel under the U.S. Constitution and violate her right to privacy in her
family relationships.178 The court reasoned that an order for the child to return to Italy was not
an order for the mother to return, she was free to remain in the United States.179 The court also
noted that the mother had not offered any evidence that the Italian courts would not treat her
custody claims fairly.180
Although included in The Convention as a “public policy clause,”181 no court has found
that a petitioner has been able to meet this standard. Further definition, supported by examples,
would enable petitioners to appropriately assert Article 20 as a defense to the return of a child
and enable courts to make consistent and appropriate findings. Forcing a child to return to an
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Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1996).

175

See id. at 443.
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See id. at 444.
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Fabri v. Pritikin-Fabri, 221 F. Supp. 2d 859 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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See id. at 873.
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See id.
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See id.
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See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 31.
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abusive environment should be recognized as a violation of the “fundamental principles of
human rights and fundamental freedoms”182 of the child.
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Advantages and Challenges of the Convention
The Convention is an international treaty that provides a mechanism to bring about the

prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained outside their country of
habitual residence in violation of rights of custody existing and actually exercised in the child’s
country of habitual residence.183 The Convention is an important tool for reuniting families
across international borders and in deterring potential abductions.184 In the United States, Hague
cases constitute about thirty percent of the total volume of abduction cases handled by the
Department of State and represent over fifty percent of the children returned.185
Article 6 of the Convention requires that each Contracting State designate a Central
Authority to discharge the duties imposed by the Convention upon such authority.186 Central
Authorities, amongst the Contracting States, “are to cooperate with each other and promote
cooperation amongst the competent authorities in their respective States to secure the prompt

182

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 20.

183

See U.S. Dep’t State, 2005 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_2537.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter
US 2005 Report].
184

See id.

.
185

See id. During the period from October 1, 2003 – September 20, 2004, the Department of State assisted in the
return to the United States of 292 children abducted or wrongfully retained overseas. See id. Of this number, 154
children were returned in cases in which a Hague application was filed. See id.
186

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 6.
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return of children”187 and to achieve the objectives of the Convention. Any person or institution
claiming that a child has been wrongfully removed or retained may apply to the Central
Authority of the child’s habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting
State for assistance in securing the return of the child.188 The Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs has been designated as the Central Authority for the Unites States under the
Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.189
The Hague Convention was designed to address the fact that because every country has
its own judicial system, there was a need for uniform legislation which would help recover
children abducted across international borders, return them promptly to their place of habitual
residence, and ensure custody and access are respected between Contracting States.190 One of
the most frustrating elements for parents whose child has been abducted is that laws and court
orders of one country are not usually recognized in a foreign country and therefore not directly
enforceable abroad.191 The Hague Convention provides a basis for dealing with this exact issue.

187

See id. at art. 7. Responsibilities of the Central Authority include: a) to discover the whereabouts of a child who
has been wrongfully removed or retained; b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by
taking or causing to be taken provisional measures; c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an
amicable resolution of the issues; d) to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the social background of
the child; e) to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in connection with the
application of the Convention; f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of juridical or administrative proceedings with
a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in proper case, to make arrangements for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access; g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provisions of
legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisors; h) to provide such administrative
arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child; and i) to keep each other
informed with respect to the operation of the Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its
application. See id.
188

See id. at art. 8 (Generally, a petition for return is filed in the Contracting State to which the child has been taken,
and it is the Central Authorities of the Contracting States of the child’s habitual residence and where the child has
been taken to that provide the majority of the assistance).

189

See Exec. Order No. 12,648, 34 Fed. Reg. 30,637 (Aug. 11, 1988) Relating to the Implementation of the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
190

See Lowe-Action Agenda, supra note 29 at iv.

191

See Consular Affairs, supra note 45.
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The Convention applies only to wrongful removals between Contracting States occurring
after its entry into force in those States.192 Although there are currently seventy-five countries
which are party to the Convention, the United States has a treaty relationship under the
Convention with only fifty-five other countries.193 When a new country accedes to the
Convention, the United States Department of State will review that country’s accession to
determine whether the necessary legal and institutional mechanisms are in place to fully
implement the Convention.194 It is only when the Department of State concludes that a country
has the capability to be an effective treaty partner that the United States will recognize their
accession and the Convention will come into force between the two countries.195 While the
potential effectiveness of the Convention in resolving cases of international parental child
abduction and deterring future abductions has been recognized,196 the actual impact is limited
until there is more universal adoption and effective implementation of the Convention.

192

See Hague Convention, supra note 10, at art. 35.

193

See US 2005 Report, supra note 181; see also U.S. Dep’t State, Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction – Party Countries and Effective Dates with U.S., available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/hague_issues/hague_issues_1487.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). The
countries with which the U.S. has a treaty relationship are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize,
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkin Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of),
and Zimbabwe.
194

See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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Although it is clear that the intent of the drafters of the Convention was that any
exceptions be interpreted narrowly,197 another challenge with the Convention is the lack of
definition of terms used in the exceptions, in particular: what constitutes a grave risk of harm?
As previously discussed, this has resulted in inconsistent interpretation and application of the
Convention both between Contracting States and within courts of contracting States, including
the United States.198 Without further clarification and definition as to what constitutes a “grave
risk of harm” the inconsistencies will continue to be pervasive and likely lead to “forum
shopping,” particularly in a country such as the United States where the State Courts and the
United States district courts both have original jurisdiction.
According to the International Forum on Parental Child Abduction held in September
1998, on average, about forty-five percent of all Hague applications for the return of a child end
with a court order for return.199 Rates for return in individual countries, however, range from a
low of five percent to a high of ninety-five percent.200 Further, while an average of twenty-three
percent of applications end with a judicial refusal, fluctuations from country to country range
from six percent to seventy-five percent.201 This data is further evidence of the inconsistent
interpretation and application of The Convention by the Contracting States.

197

See Pérez-Vera, supra note 5, at ¶ 34 (exceptions are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is
not to become a dead letter); see also Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51
Fed. Reg. at 10,509 (any exception must be drawn narrowly lest their application undermine the express purpose of
the Convention – to effect the prompt return of abducted children).
198

See OJJDP Family Resource Guide, supra note 30 at 50. See also Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 overturning In
re Walsh, 31 F. Supp. 2d 200, Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 overturning Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240.
199

See Lowe–Action Agenda, supra note 29 at 7.

200

See id

.
201

See id. at 8.
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The need for clear definition of terms and uniformity of application, with regard to the
Article 13(b) exceptions, is particularly critical since under the terms of the Convention, courts
are not permitted to consider the merits of the case when making a determination with regard to
the return of a child, and must respect the decision of the court having jurisdiction controlling
custody. Following a strict interpretation of the Convention, a child should be returned despite
domestic violence, abuse and other severe family law matters, only when there is no other
alternative available. It is imperative that a balance be struck between respect for the laws and
court orders of Contracting States and recognition that ongoing exposure to incidents of domestic
violence and abuse presents empirical evidence of a situation which would subject the child to
“grave risk of physical or psychological harm” or “otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation.” While the Convention is clearly concerned with protecting children against the
harmful effects of international abduction, the harmful effects of returning a child to an abusive
parent must also be considered.
There is also no obligation, under the terms of the Convention, for Contracting States to
take responsibility for the safety of children returned to their country of habitual residence under
the Convention.202 Under the Convention a potential grave risk of harm can, at times, be
mitigated sufficiently by the acceptance of “undertakings” and sufficient guarantees of
performance of those undertakings by the respective parties,203 resulting in a child’s return. This
approach allows courts to evaluate the placement options and legal safeguards in the country of
habitual residence to preserve the child's safety.204 While this approach may best allow for the

202

See id. at iv.

203

See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219.

204

See id.
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achievement of the goal of the Convention of returning the child to their county of habitual
residence, there is no provision in the Convention for the country of habitual residence to
monitor and ensure compliance with these undertakings.
B.

Recommendations
Although the Convention has been in force since 1976, there are currently only seventy-

five Contracting States to the Convention.205 There are many countries in large parts of the
world that are not signatories to the Convention.206 Outgoing abduction cases to non-Hague
countries are the most difficult to resolve largely because courts do not automatically honor
custody orders made by judges in other countries.207
The United States has actively encouraged countries to accede to the Convention,
recognizing its potential effectiveness not just in resolving cases of international parental child
abduction, but also in deterring future abductions.208 International pressure must be asserted to
expand membership of the Hague Convention.209 Additionally, countries that are members of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child need to be reminded of their
obligations to promote accessions.210
The basic issue of custody rights is not within the scope of The Convention, therefore the
Convention must necessarily “coexist with the rules of each Contracting State on applicable law
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and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.”211 While it is imperative that the
judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting States are respected, it is also important
that there be consistency with regard to the application of the Convention. There must be a more
common approach to the application of the exceptions provided in The Convention.
In 1990, the United States Congress passed a resolution expressing their sense that “for
purposes of determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of one’s spouse
should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be placed in the custody
of the abusive spouse.”212 While this resolution dealt explicitly with the issue of custody, which
is out of the scope of the Convention, it clearly reflects the belief that credible evidence of
spousal abuse presumptively presents a grave risk of harm to the child. Credible evidence of
domestic violence and/or child abuse should be included in the definition of a “grave risk of
harm” in the Convention and, therefore, be considered as meeting the standard for an exception
under Article 13(b) of the Convention by all courts in all Contracting States.
Additionally, courts in Contracting States need to recognize the significant impact of
domestic violence and child abuse on children. The courts must recognize that forcing a child to
return to an abuse environment violates the “fundamental principles of human rights and
fundamental freedoms”213 of the child. International standards regarding fundamental principles
of human rights and fundamental principals must be established. These standards must
effectively co-exist with local law and be applied consistently to protect the interests of the
children.
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Where the courts determine that there is not clear and convincing evidence for an
exception under Article 13(b) or Article 20 of the Convention, and the child is returned, the
Convention must provide that judges and central authorities work closely together to ensure that
the child is properly safeguarded and protected.214 This is particularly true in the case where the
child has been returned subject to acceptance of undertakings applicable to either the party
seeking the return or the party responsible for the wrongful removal. The Central Authority of
each Contracting State should have an obligation to protect the welfare of children returned to
that country under the Convention.215 This obligation could be easily incorporated into Article
7(h) of the Convention requiring that central authorities “provide such administrative
arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child.”216
V.

CONCLUSION
Each year more than 200,000 children are abducted by family members and 58,000 by

non-family members in the United States alone.217 While the abduction of a child by a parent
may be traumatic for the child, as well as one or both of the parents, the return of the child to an
abusive home may be more traumatic or even deadly. The Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction is an attempt to address the increasing incidence of
international parental child abduction, and secure the prompt return of the child to their country
of habitual residence. This return must not, however, be at the expense of the child’s welfare and
must more effectively and consistently consider what is “In the Best Interest of the Child.”
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